On April 17, 2020, Press Note No. 3 (2020 Series) was issued by the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India. The Press Note seeks to curb opportunistic takeovers and acquisitions of Indian companies by Chinese investors and companies due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. The Press Note has far-reaching implications on the overall FDI regime. This note analyzes some key considerations arising from the changes introduced by the Press Note, including (i) interpretation of ‘beneficial owner’; (ii) impact on indirect foreign investment; (iii) exercise of warrants and options and schemes of mergers; and (iv) bonus and rights issuances.
Non-banking financial companies (NBFCs), as the name suggests, are companies that aren’t licensed to offer the full range of banking services. Instead, they provide a smaller bundle of financial services targeted towards particular groups. In order to provide credit to such groups, NBFCs need to raise capital at frequent intervals. Hence, raising capital is fundamental to the sector’s growth.
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), India’s central bank, regulates NBFCs. One of the RBI’s most noteworthy rules pertains to the change of management and control of an NBFC. The RBI currently administers this rule through the Non-Banking Financial Companies (Approval of Acquisition or Transfer of Control) Directions, 2015 (NBFC Directions). It has been more than four years since the NBFC Directions came into effect. During this time, NBFCs have faced difficulties, particularly with its Change of Shareholding Rule. This note discusses its shortcomings and proffers a new rule to take its place.
In a significant move, the Indian Government has, in a bid to curb opportunistic takeovers of Indian companies as a result of COVID-19, directed that all investments from countries that share land borders with India will require prior regulatory approval. This change covers both direct and indirect investments and comes in the wake of recent acquisitions and exploration of investment opportunities by Chinese investors in India, scrutiny by the Indian securities regulator of Chinese ownership of portfolio investors and the introduction of stricter FDI regimes worldwide.
In mid-March 2020, German media reported that the United States President had offered to take over CureVac, a German vaccine firm which was working on a vaccine for COVID-19, to secure the vaccine only for the United States – these reports were later denied. Indian media has recently reported that the Chinese central bank now holds more than 1% shareholding in HDFC, India’s largest housing finance company. The COVID-19 pandemic has not only brought healthcare and critical infrastructure into focus from an FDI perspective, but has also weakened companies in other sectors and made them easy targets for creditors and opportunistic buyers.
This note examines the measures taken by certain countries, particularly in Europe, to protect their businesses from being taken over by foreign investors as well as India’s current position on FDI. While India has so far focused on liberalizing the FDI regime, if COVID-19 propels the Indian Government to follow suit, investors can expect introduction of additional restrictions on FDI as well as extended timelines for approval.
With the aim of enhancing “ease of doing business” and “promoting the principle of Maximum Governance and Minimum Government”, the Government of India abolished the Foreign Investment Promotion Board on May 24, 2017. In its place, the relevant administrative ministry/department in consultation with the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade are now directly responsible for processing applications for foreign direct investment in India in sectors which require prior approval of the Government.
The move was expected to make the process of obtaining FDI approval faster and more efficient. Almost three years after the move, we consider in this note the current framework for FDI approval and areas for improvement.
The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 (“PDP Bill”), which was presented before the lower house of the Indian Parliament on December 11, 2019, seeks to provide for the protection of personal data of individuals and establish a Data Protection Authority. The PDP Bill has been referred to a joint select committee of both the houses of the Indian Parliament, which is expected to submit its report in early 2020. Accordingly, there may be changes to the PDP Bill based on the recommendations of the joint select committee. Once enacted, the PDP Bill will replace Section 43 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011 and prevail over any other inconsistent laws in this regard (e.g., any sector-specific laws). This note provides an overview of the PDP Bill
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) faces numerous challenges in investigating and determining insider trading violations. Lack of direct or conclusive evidence of violations is a key challenge in most cases. On 10 June 2019, SEBI issued a discussion paper on a proposed informant mechanism under which whistleblowers will be rewarded for reporting instances of insider trading.
Recent shareholder activism and regulatory action have focused attention on the issue of executive compensation in India. The Companies Act, 2013 (act), restricts the total managerial remuneration payable by a public company to its directors and managers in a financial year to no more than 11% of its net profits for that financial year.
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 (PITR), prohibits communication of unpublished price sensitive information (UPSI) to any person except where it is in furtherance of legitimate purposes, performance of duties or discharge of legal obligations.