PNB Housing Finance: The (Missing?) Registered Valuer Report

On June 15, we had written about a proposed preferential issue by PNB Housing Finance, in respect of which a proxy advisor issued a report asking public shareholders to vote against the proposed investment. As an alternative to a preferential issue, the report suggested that the company should have considered a “rights issue”. In our previous article, we considered a “rights issue” and a “preferential issue” from the perspective of certainty in funding, disclosure obligations, approvals and timelines and pricing.

The debate has since focused on whether the proposed preferential issue required a report of a registered valuer and whether such a report was in fact procured. In this article, we consider the legal framework around which the debate turns, comprising the SEBI ICDR Regulations, the Companies Act and PNB Housing Finance’s articles of association.


Corporate Governance

Corporate Governance and the case of PNB Housing Finance

Recently PNB Housing Finance announced a “preferential issue” of shares, through which the Carlyle Group will acquire a controlling interest in the company. A proxy advisor has issued a report asking public shareholders to vote against the proposed investment. The report argues that the price at which Carlyle will be investing in the company belies the company’s true value. As an alternative to a preferential issue, the report suggests that the company should have considered a “rights issue” in which all shareholders will be entitled to participate. In this context, it is important to consider whether a preferential issue and a rights issue are, in fact, comparable options for fundraising and accordingly, if there is merit in the allegation of poor corporate governance that has been levelled against the target company’s board of directors.


Defining Control: Future Retail vs. Amazon

The recent interpretation of “control” by the High Court of Delhi in a litigation between Future Retail and Amazon has once again focused attention on the perennial question of what constitutes control. As described in more detail in the note, this question cannot be considered in abstract; it must be considered in the context of a specific legislation or policy and the objective it seeks to achieve. The relevant provisions of the FDI policy, which provide the context in this case, may not have been correctly appreciated.


Bribery and Money-laundering Risk Management in M&A

As government agencies and regulators around the world are strengthening their enforcement efforts (having unearthed major bribery, corruption and money laundering related lapses by various corporates in the recent years), corporate activities have come under increased regulatory scrutiny. A target’s historical and existing anti-money laundering (AML) or anti-bribery, anti-corruption (ABAC) violations and resultant liabilities typically become the acquirer’s responsibility post-closing. This can have far-reaching legal, business and reputational consequences on the acquirer and in an extreme case, could result in an acquisition being a failure. As a result of this, acquirers have to be cognizant of not only any post-closing transgressions but also any pre-closing ones that they know, or ought to have known. The approach of a hurriedly-conducted limited due diligence with heavy reliance on warranties alone is therefore a risky one.
This note is divided into four parts – the first part provides a general overview of the key legislations. The second part highlights certain factors such as the target’s jurisdiction, sector, local laws and other cultural and geographical issues that typically influence such AML and ABAC issues. The third part outlines safeguards that are customarily adopted by the acquirers and the last part proposes certain measures that may be considered and implemented for effective risk-management by the acquirers.


RBI Directions to NBFCs: Change of Shareholding Rule

Non-banking financial companies (NBFCs), as the name suggests, are companies that aren’t licensed to offer the full range of banking services. Instead, they provide a smaller bundle of financial services targeted towards particular groups. In order to provide credit to such groups, NBFCs need to raise capital at frequent intervals. Hence, raising capital is fundamental to the sector’s growth.

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), India’s central bank, regulates NBFCs. One of the RBI’s most noteworthy rules pertains to the change of management and control of an NBFC. The RBI currently administers this rule through the Non-Banking Financial Companies (Approval of Acquisition or Transfer of Control) Directions, 2015 (NBFC Directions). It has been more than four years since the NBFC Directions came into effect. During this time, NBFCs have faced difficulties, particularly with its Change of Shareholding Rule. This note discusses its shortcomings and proffers a new rule to take its place.


A New Method of Minority Squ(ease) Out

On February 3, 2020, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs notified sub-sections (11) and (12) of section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 along with also notifying the Companies (Compromises, Arrangements and Amalgamations) Amendment Rules, 2020 and the National Company Law Tribunal (Amendment) Rules, 2020 (collectively, the “Takeover Notification”), which would enable shareholders of unlisted companies holding at least 75% securities (including depository receipts) with voting rights to acquire the remaining minority shareholders pursuant to a court-approved compromise or arrangement that includes a takeover offer.

Certain other methods that are generally considered for buying-out minority shareholders, often termed as minority squeeze-outs, include undertaking a selective reduction of share capital under section 66 of the Companies Act and the purchase of minority shareholding by a majority shareholder holding 90% or more of the share capital under section 236 of the Companies Act, 2013.

This note briefly discusses the new method of minority squeeze-out introduced by the Takeover Notification and considers whether the Takeover Notification makes it easier to squeeze out the minority shareholders as compared to the other available options mentioned in the paragraph above.