Recently, pursuant to its decision in Ebix Singapore Private Limited v Committee of Creditors of Educomp Solutions Limited and Anr., the Supreme Court of India extensively analyzed the status of a resolution plan approved by the Committee of Creditors but pending approval of the National Company Law Tribunal under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Supreme Court observed that such a resolution plan binds the Committee of Creditors and the Resolution Applicant and reinforced the strength of the decision of the Committee of Creditors in favor of a resolution plan. The Supreme Court also, once again, clarified the scope of scrutiny, at the stage of approval of a resolution plan, by the National Company Law Tribunal and consequently by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal.
Recently the Standing Committee on Finance in a report placed before the Parliament on August 3, 2021 proposed a Code of Conduct for the Committee of Creditors in a corporate insolvency resolution process under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. Following such report, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India has published a discussion paper on August 27, 2021 which includes, among other things, a draft Code of Conduct. This note considers an alternative approach for such a Code of Conduct.
By an order dated July 19, 2021, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (the “NCLAT”) stayed the operation of the order of the National Company Law Tribunal (the “NCLT”) which had approved a resolution plan in relation to the Videocon group. In staying the operation of the NCLT’s order, the NCLAT appears to have been influenced by the observations of the NCLT on two points, a substantial haircut and a breach of confidentiality. Apart from these two points, this note considers a possible shortcoming in the NCLT order in relation to treatment of dissenting creditors.
The vexed question of whether two Indian parties can validly choose a foreign seat of arbitration under Indian law and the applicability of interim relief, in the event of such a choice, remained a long-standing debate. It is relevant to note that there was never an express statutory bar on Indian parties’ choice to select a foreign seat of arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the “Arbitration Act”). However, the complex interplay of the party-centric definition of “international commercial arbitration” with certain other provisions of the Arbitration Act, in the context of a fundamental principle of Indian law that no Indian party can exclude the application of Indian law to itself, led to conflicting decisions on this issue. The uncertainty forced Indian parties to actively avoid a foreign seat of arbitration to circumvent a potential challenge to the validity of the arbitration agreement at the time of enforcement of the award. Recently, the Supreme Court of India revisited this question in PASL Wind Solutions Private Limited v. GE Power Conversion India Private Limited, 2021 SCCOnLine SC 331 and affirmed that two Indian parties can not only validly select a foreign seat of arbitration but can equally apply to Indian courts for interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act.
A key feature of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (the “Act”) is the power of the investigating agency under the Act, i.e., the Directorate of Enforcement (the “ED”), to provisionally attach any property believed to be involved in money laundering for an initial period up to 180 days from the date of such attachment. This provision ensures that proceeds that are obtained directly or indirectly from the offences noted under the Act (“scheduled offences”) are not dealt with in any manner so as to frustrate proceedings relating to the confiscation of such proceeds under the Act. Ex facie, this provision appears to be in direct conflict with the rights of bona fide third-parties such as banks, mortgagees, transferee, and lessee etc. who may otherwise have a lawful interest in a property alleged to be involved in money laundering and had no knowledge of such involvement at the time of acquisition of interest in such property. In light of this apparent conflict, does the Act adequately safeguard the rights of such third-parties who have a lawful interest in a property provisionally attached by the ED?
Pursuant to Section 60(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 the National Company Law Tribunal is bestowed with wide jurisdiction to decide: (i) ‘any’ application or proceeding against a corporate debtor; (ii) ‘any’ claim made by or against a corporate debtor including claims by or against its subsidiaries; and (iii) ‘any’ questions of priority or ‘any’ question of law or facts, arising out of or in relation to insolvency resolution or liquidation proceedings of the corporate debtor. Are there any limits to such jurisdiction of the National Company Law Tribunal?
By a judgment dated November 15, 2019, the Supreme Court of India in the case of Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Others delivered its final verdict on the acquisition of Essar Steel India Limited under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The proceedings under the IBC in relation to the acquisition of Essar Steel lasted for more than two years and laid down precedents on several questions arising out of the then newly introduced insolvency legislation in India. This paper is a comment on this judgment. It critically analyses the decision of the Supreme Court and the impact of the judgment on insolvency law in India.
On March 26, the Supreme Court delivered its verdict in a matter that has grabbed headlines for more than four years. Two prominent business groups, historically inter-connected with each other in multiple ways, have engaged in a no-holds-barred battle that by all accounts will be a significant marker in the history of corporate India. It started at a board meeting of Tata Sons on Oct. 24, 2016, when Cyrus Mistry was removed by the board of directors from his position as executive chairman. This led to a series of cascading events that ultimately ended up in the courts.
The Supreme Court of India in the Essar Steel case held that allowing claims apart from those covered in a resolution plan to survive after approval of a resolution plan militates against the rationale of Section 31 of the IBC. The Supreme Court recognized that a successful resolution applicant should be given an opportunity to take over and run the business of the corporate debtor on a clean slate. Subsequently, the legislature introduced Section 32A of the IBC to provide that a corporate debtor shall not be prosecuted for an offence committed prior to the corporate insolvency resolution process, subject to certain conditions. Recently, the Supreme Court dismissed a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of Section 32A of the IBC. The Supreme Court issued an unequivocal declaration of the need to give the successful resolution applicant a fresh start.
The recent interpretation of “control” by the High Court of Delhi in a litigation between Future Retail and Amazon has once again focused attention on the perennial question of what constitutes control. As described in more detail in the note, this question cannot be considered in abstract; it must be considered in the context of a specific legislation or policy and the objective it seeks to achieve. The relevant provisions of the FDI policy, which provide the context in this case, may not have been correctly appreciated.