In November 2019, Dewan Housing became the first non-banking financial company to be referred to the insolvency resolution process under Indian bankruptcy law. The process has seen four rounds of bids, of which the last two were driven by a bid submitted after the deadline. While one bidder withdrew from the process on grounds of unfair treatment, other bidders have protested against the late-stage non-compliant bid, which has further prolonged the insolvency resolution process and created a threat of litigation. While late-stage bids may be acceptable in exceptional circumstances, this cannot be allowed to become a regular feature of the insolvency resolution process. As described in more detail in this note, maximization of value of assets is not the sole objective of an insolvency resolution regime; such regime must also provide transparency and certainty, symmetry of information and a time-bound process to better preserve economic value.
Since January 2020, there have been more than 10 public issues of non-convertible debentures (NCDs) and over 1,600 private placements of corporate bonds in India. M&A transactions in India have also increasingly witnessed NCDs as a preferred instrument for funding, which may be attributable to the benefits that NCDs could provide to investors vis-à-vis equity instruments. Separate regulatory frameworks apply to acquisition of NCDs by registered foreign portfolio investors on the one hand and other foreign investors on the other hand. Further, Indian regulators have sought to encourage offshore debt funding, for example, by introducing the voluntary retention route for foreign portfolio investment in debt instruments. Accordingly, this note provides an overview of investment routes available to foreign investors in relation to NCDs.
This note, first published on the National Law School Business Law Review blog, discusses recent amendments to the [Indian] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, which inter-alia temporarily prevent creditors from initiating insolvency proceedings against corporate debtors. While the proposed changes are a step in the right direction, the Government should also consider the impact of the pandemic on pending proceedings as well as alternative mechanisms to restructure debt and resolve defaults in a cost-effective manner to preserve value.
This note attempts to explain the unique predicament of operational creditors under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). It examines the various factors considered by the judiciary in recent pronouncements that have shaped the status of the operational creditors and outlines solutions that could be considered for a constructive resolution of the issues at hand.
This note is divided into four parts – the first part discusses certain issues considered by the Supreme Court in Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and others, and its key findings in this regard. In the second part, the authors highlight how the IBC and the ruling of the Supreme Court unfairly disadvantage operational creditors, and offer solutions in line with international practice. In the third part, the authors point out a lacuna in the IBC regarding the treatment of the claims of creditors with ‘disputed’ claims in an insolvency resolution process and propose an alternate framework to determine such claims. The last part underscores the key takeaways from this article and a few concluding thoughts.
On June 5, 2020, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was amended to inter-alia prohibit creditors and corporate debtors from initiating corporate insolvency resolution proceedings in respect of defaults arising during the six (6) month period from and including March 25, 2020 (the date of commencement of the national lockdown) – this period may be extended up to one (1) year.
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, several corporate borrowers will find themselves in challenging financial circumstances that may require negotiations with their lenders or even full-fledged restructuring. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and Indian courts have granted temporary relief measures to offset the strain on borrowers. If required by borrowers or lenders, India offers the following out-of-court and in-court restructuring and enforcement mechanisms: (i) the RBI Framework for Resolution of Stressed Assets (introduced in June 2019); (ii) the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act); and (iii) the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). This note sets out such mechanisms and available relief measures. Given that the situation is constantly evolving, borrowers and lenders should remain vigilant about tracking legal and regulatory developments.
Non-banking financial companies (NBFCs), as the name suggests, are companies that aren’t licensed to offer the full range of banking services. Instead, they provide a smaller bundle of financial services targeted towards particular groups. In order to provide credit to such groups, NBFCs need to raise capital at frequent intervals. Hence, raising capital is fundamental to the sector’s growth.
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), India’s central bank, regulates NBFCs. One of the RBI’s most noteworthy rules pertains to the change of management and control of an NBFC. The RBI currently administers this rule through the Non-Banking Financial Companies (Approval of Acquisition or Transfer of Control) Directions, 2015 (NBFC Directions). It has been more than four years since the NBFC Directions came into effect. During this time, NBFCs have faced difficulties, particularly with its Change of Shareholding Rule. This note discusses its shortcomings and proffers a new rule to take its place.
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused widespread disruption of businesses and daily life. As governments across the world struggle to contain the pandemic, a number of regulatory and policy measures are being implemented by the Government of India to minimize the impact of the disruption caused to several classes of persons and corporate bodies.
A recent measure is the increase in the threshold for default by corporate debtors under Section 4 of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (the “Code”) from INR 100,000 to INR 10,000,000 and a potential suspension of certain key provisions of the Code. These measures may have some positive and certain unintended consequences of concern to stakeholders.
The outbreak of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has caused widespread disruption of businesses and daily life. As governments across the world struggle to contain the pandemic, a number of measures are being implemented aimed at minimizing its spread. In India, such measures are increasingly taking the form of mandatory social distancing through the imposition of a series of restrictions. As the situation evolves, the requirement for further restrictions is being constantly evaluated by governments and new measures are being implemented. The pandemic and the resulting measures raise a host of legal issues and concerns for businesses. This update analyzes certain legal and regulatory concerns arising in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent restrictions.
Directors of a company in financial difficulty should be aware that their conduct may be subject to close scrutiny if the company is subject to insolvency proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, as amended. The directors of such companies should take all steps to ensure that the company continues as a going concern. This is relevant as courts have held that unless all measures have been taken to revive a company, the making of a winding-up order may not be in the best interests of creditors, and going concern values may result in higher repayments to the creditors. In this regard, directors of a company in financial difficulty should be aware that their conduct may be subject to close scrutiny if the company falls into insolvency and such directors should be able to defend their actions provided that they were made in good faith.