The recent amendment to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”) replaces an ordinance promulgated earlier this year, and provides for a pre-packaged insolvency resolution process (“PIRP”) for micro, small and medium enterprises (“MSMEs”). The PIRP comes in the backdrop of the financial stress caused by COVID-19 and aims to cause minimal disruption to business and to ensure job preservation. While the PIRP is well intended, how effective it will be in resolving stress on corporate debtors in the MSME sector will come down to how it is implemented and if required, fine tuning its design.
A key feature of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (the “Act”) is the power of the investigating agency under the Act, i.e., the Directorate of Enforcement (the “ED”), to provisionally attach any property believed to be involved in money laundering for an initial period up to 180 days from the date of such attachment. This provision ensures that proceeds that are obtained directly or indirectly from the offences noted under the Act (“scheduled offences”) are not dealt with in any manner so as to frustrate proceedings relating to the confiscation of such proceeds under the Act. Ex facie, this provision appears to be in direct conflict with the rights of bona fide third-parties such as banks, mortgagees, transferee, and lessee etc. who may otherwise have a lawful interest in a property alleged to be involved in money laundering and had no knowledge of such involvement at the time of acquisition of interest in such property. In light of this apparent conflict, does the Act adequately safeguard the rights of such third-parties who have a lawful interest in a property provisionally attached by the ED?
Pursuant to Section 60(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 the National Company Law Tribunal is bestowed with wide jurisdiction to decide: (i) ‘any’ application or proceeding against a corporate debtor; (ii) ‘any’ claim made by or against a corporate debtor including claims by or against its subsidiaries; and (iii) ‘any’ questions of priority or ‘any’ question of law or facts, arising out of or in relation to insolvency resolution or liquidation proceedings of the corporate debtor. Are there any limits to such jurisdiction of the National Company Law Tribunal?
By a judgment dated November 15, 2019, the Supreme Court of India in the case of Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Others delivered its final verdict on the acquisition of Essar Steel India Limited under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The proceedings under the IBC in relation to the acquisition of Essar Steel lasted for more than two years and laid down precedents on several questions arising out of the then newly introduced insolvency legislation in India. This paper is a comment on this judgment. It critically analyses the decision of the Supreme Court and the impact of the judgment on insolvency law in India.
In November 2019, Dewan Housing became the first non-banking financial company to be referred to the insolvency resolution process under Indian bankruptcy law. The process has seen four rounds of bids, of which the last two were driven by a bid submitted after the deadline. While one bidder withdrew from the process on grounds of unfair treatment, other bidders have protested against the late-stage non-compliant bid, which has further prolonged the insolvency resolution process and created a threat of litigation. While late-stage bids may be acceptable in exceptional circumstances, this cannot be allowed to become a regular feature of the insolvency resolution process. As described in more detail in this note, maximization of value of assets is not the sole objective of an insolvency resolution regime; such regime must also provide transparency and certainty, symmetry of information and a time-bound process to better preserve economic value.
Since January 2020, there have been more than 10 public issues of non-convertible debentures (NCDs) and over 1,600 private placements of corporate bonds in India. M&A transactions in India have also increasingly witnessed NCDs as a preferred instrument for funding, which may be attributable to the benefits that NCDs could provide to investors vis-à-vis equity instruments. Separate regulatory frameworks apply to acquisition of NCDs by registered foreign portfolio investors on the one hand and other foreign investors on the other hand. Further, Indian regulators have sought to encourage offshore debt funding, for example, by introducing the voluntary retention route for foreign portfolio investment in debt instruments. Accordingly, this note provides an overview of investment routes available to foreign investors in relation to NCDs.
This note, first published on the National Law School Business Law Review blog, discusses recent amendments to the [Indian] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, which inter-alia temporarily prevent creditors from initiating insolvency proceedings against corporate debtors. While the proposed changes are a step in the right direction, the Government should also consider the impact of the pandemic on pending proceedings as well as alternative mechanisms to restructure debt and resolve defaults in a cost-effective manner to preserve value.
This note attempts to explain the unique predicament of operational creditors under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). It examines the various factors considered by the judiciary in recent pronouncements that have shaped the status of the operational creditors and outlines solutions that could be considered for a constructive resolution of the issues at hand.
This note is divided into four parts – the first part discusses certain issues considered by the Supreme Court in Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and others, and its key findings in this regard. In the second part, the authors highlight how the IBC and the ruling of the Supreme Court unfairly disadvantage operational creditors, and offer solutions in line with international practice. In the third part, the authors point out a lacuna in the IBC regarding the treatment of the claims of creditors with ‘disputed’ claims in an insolvency resolution process and propose an alternate framework to determine such claims. The last part underscores the key takeaways from this article and a few concluding thoughts.
On June 5, 2020, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was amended to inter-alia prohibit creditors and corporate debtors from initiating corporate insolvency resolution proceedings in respect of defaults arising during the six (6) month period from and including March 25, 2020 (the date of commencement of the national lockdown) – this period may be extended up to one (1) year.
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, several corporate borrowers will find themselves in challenging financial circumstances that may require negotiations with their lenders or even full-fledged restructuring. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and Indian courts have granted temporary relief measures to offset the strain on borrowers. If required by borrowers or lenders, India offers the following out-of-court and in-court restructuring and enforcement mechanisms: (i) the RBI Framework for Resolution of Stressed Assets (introduced in June 2019); (ii) the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act); and (iii) the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). This note sets out such mechanisms and available relief measures. Given that the situation is constantly evolving, borrowers and lenders should remain vigilant about tracking legal and regulatory developments.